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The Paradox of Stabilizing Coalition Government
Electoral changes have left their mark in the coalition politics of Belgium and
the Netherlands. In the late 1960s, the lines of loyalty between parties and
voters started to unravel, and the tension in government coalitions between
cooperation and conflict became more manifest (Andeweg, 1988; Deschouwer,
1994). Electoral competition fed mistrust, and conflicts between coalition
parties became a frequent cause of government termination (Mu¨ller and Strøm,
2000, 586). The need for a workable modus vivendi for parties in office together
led to a practice of negotiating coalition agreements during government
formation. These agreements, written by party prominents under a veil of
secrecy, became comprehensive documents containing substantive and
procedural deals over a broad range of issues, most importantly issues that
were controversial (Mu¨ller and Strøm, 2000; Timmermans, 2003). As in other
countries with multiparty governments, coalition agreements were meant to
help contain controversy (Klingemann et al., 1994; Keman, 2002; Timmermans,
2003).
Despite ongoing electoral changes and increasing volatility, the longevity of
governments in Belgium and the Netherlands has increased, particularly
in the last 15 years. In both countries, governments reached the end of
their legal term in office more often than before.1 As governments in these
countries are always coalitions, threats to survival come from conflicts between
or within the parties in office together. However, internal conflict within the
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cabinet has become less frequent as a cause of termination (Woldendorp et al.,
2000).
At first sight, this increased longevity is surprising, as electoral shifts may
induce parties to be opportunistic and prefer loose to tight coalitions (Laver
and Schofield, 1990; Lupia and Strøm, 1995). However, electoral volatility also
involves uncertainty, even for the previously dominant Christian Democratic
parties, and this may deter party leaders from disruptive actions when in office.
The increased significance of electoral ups and downs may balance the
temptation for coalition parties to line up with partners from outside. It may
make parties more risk averse, and help in explaining the paradoxical trend of
a simultaneous increase in electoral volatility and government survival.
It is thus tempting to attribute the increased government duration in
Belgium and the Netherlands to the occurrence of coalition agreements that
commit the parties in office and reduce the hazards of early termination.
Parties may have learned how to keep faith through emerging norms of
behaviour and maintain mutual control for the sake of peace and stability
(Axelrod, 1984; Gilbert, 1993; Timmermans, forthcoming). In addition,
government parties have created informal arenas for conflict resolution and
enforcement of deals — arenas that typically resemble the government
formation arenas in which the deals were made in the first place (Peterson
et al., 1983). Moreover, coalition agreements are important for ministers to
bind the other party branches, which for electoral and internal organizational
reasons may be less oriented to making coalition-broad compromises (De
Winter 2001, 2002). Other countries also experienced some or most of these
developments (Mair, 2002; Strøm et al., forthcoming). Our interest in Belgium
and the Netherlands stems from this observation: in no other countries are
coalition agreements as frequent and long as in these two countries (Mu¨ller and
Strøm, 2000, 576).
In this article we focus on conflict resolution and enforcement of coalition
agreements in Belgium and the Netherlands. We consider to what extent the
increase in government duration is the result of emerging mechanisms of
coalition governance, designed as they are for political steering and conflict
management. We present structural and procedural arrangements for coalition
governance, beginning with written coalition policy agreements. Our empirical
analysis focuses on interparty conflicts within six recent governments and
patterns of conflict resolution within them. How much evidence is there for the
hypothesis that the increase in government duration results from a learning
process in which writing and enforcing coalition agreements are a central
element? What other mechanisms of coalition governance contribute to the
enhanced life of governments? We also consider points of variation, and
examine whether various forms of coalition governance may have functional
equivalence. By doing this, we stress that our aim of the present analysis is to
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explore how two countries that are similar in their increased electoral volatility
and government stability have developed mechanisms for coping with threats
to government survival. We conclude by discussing the meaning of the
emerging types of coalition governance for the democratic systems of Belgium
and the Netherlands. Since the mid-1990s, there is talk of a ‘new politics’. What
does this talk mean beyond political rhetoric? Is coalition governance in the
two countries feasible when the alleged and criticized ‘old’ politics is
abandoned? These points bring us right into the recent debate in both
countries, and we relate them to the findings in our analysis.
Coalition Governance: How Conflicts are Managed
Recent contributions to the literature on coalition politics show a growing
interest in questions of coalition governance. The concept of coalition
governance links formation and termination to the actual life of governments,
and contributions deal with institutional and behavioural factors. Andeweg
(2000a) for example considers the mechanisms through which ministers are
kept to the collective responsibility of the cabinet. The impact of decision rules
also received empirical and theoretical attention (country chapters in Laver
and Shepsle, 1994; Huber and McCarthy, 2001). Further, the role of
legislatures in coalition maintenance has been considered. Druckman and
Thies (2002) study upper chamber majority support as a condition for coalition
government survival, and find that governments controlling a majority in both
chambers of bicameral legislatures last longer.2 The problem of monitoring
delegated power in coalitions is addressed by Thies (2001), who focuses on the
hypothesis that junior ministers are party ‘watchdogs’, and argues that absence
of institutional mechanisms for monitoring induces this watchdog construc-
tion. More systematic attention for cross-country variation in institutional
arrangements for coalition governance also is beginning to appear (Strøm
et al., 2003, forthcoming).
These recent contributions are on the way forward, but still much of what
goes on in coalition governments remains a black box. For example, we still
know little about how government parties deal with policy conflicts between
them. Were these conflicts settled in some way in the coalition agreement in
government formation, or have they emerged later? And who initiated the
conflicts: ministers, parliamentary groups, or extraparliamentary party
organizations? In what political arenas were conflicts fought out and how
were they managed and resolved?
By policy conflicts between parties we mean major points of disagreement
over issues in which actors take sides along party lines. Such issues thus
involve the mobilization of party branches — ministerial, parliamentary,
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extraparliamentary — or even of entire parties acting en bloc in the dispute. The
construction of issues as matters of party principle makes that decision-making
often is protracted or even leads to stalemate. This type thus differs from
interdepartmental conflicts, in which ministers are involved as heads of their
government department (Andeweg, 1988; Timmermans and Bakema, 1990).
Interparty conflicts are, next to scheduled elections, the second most important
cause of cabinet termination in Western European coalition systems (Mu¨ller and
Strøm, 2000, 586). Interdepartmental conflicts may be more frequent, but we
focus on interparty conflicts because they are more directly a threat to
government survival, and thus need special attention in coalition governance.3
Interparty conflicts may begin as interdepartmental conflicts that escalate.
The risk of escalation depends in part on the distribution of cabinet portfolios.
Key portfolios controlled by different parties may induce these parties to
collective decision-making, particularly in situations of mistrust. Since parties
often are alert on making a fair distribution of key portfolios during
government formation, this incentive for collective decision-making exists in
most coalition governments, and this puts the unwritten rule of ministerial
nonintervention under stress. In our analysis, we focus on interparty conflicts,
whatever the origin of these conflicts.
Cases: Belgian and Dutch coalition governments
We consider manifest interparty conflict on policy issues and management of
this conflict within three Belgian and three Dutch government coalitions since
the early 1990s.4 The cases are recent successive governments, including and
excluding the Christian Democrats who long took a central position in
governments in both countries.5 For Belgium, the analysed governments are
Dehaene I (1992–1995), Dehaene II (1995–1999), and Verhofstadt I (1999–
2003). The Dutch cases are Lubbers III (1989–1994), Kok I (1994–1998), and
Kok II (1998–2002). We focus on recent governments in order to see the
institutionalization, if any, of the mechanisms of conflict management at a time
when governments in both countries were becoming more stable (the long-time
difference between the Netherlands and Belgium was closed). The reason for
considering successive governments is that this allows us to see how unresolved
conflicts were taken up by the next government.
Coalition birth: mapping policy agreement
The policy controversies involved in building the Belgian and Dutch
governments differed. In Belgium, the Dehaene I government was formed in
1992 after three failed attempts from which finally the French- and Dutch-
speaking Socialists (PS, SP) and the Dutch- and French- speaking Christian
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Democrats (CVP, PSC) emerged as the four parties in office. This protracted
formation resulted in a coalition agreement that was much shorter than before,
and initially was meant to sustain an ‘emergency government’. This
government remained in office just over 3 years but ended prematurely
because early elections were held, to the strategic benefit of the CVP, the prime
minister’s party which had suffered losses in preceding elections. After the
elections of 1995, the same coalition was rebuilt, and despite a time pressure
due to an upcoming European summit, the partners drafted a much more
comprehensive and also more precise coalition agreement than the previous
one. The Dehaene II government reached the end of its official term. During
election time in 1999, the usual secret scenarios for cooperation were disrupted
by an environmental scandal, which led to an electoral victory for the Greens.
A window of opportunity opened to build a secular coalition without the
Christian Democrats, and a ‘rainbow’ coalition including the Dutch-speaking
and French-speaking Greens was built. This six-party coalition led by the
Liberal Verhofstadt wrote a fairly extensive and specific coalition agreement
that was seen to be ‘breaking with the past’ (De Winter and Dumont, 1999).
Each party was given a sphere of influence in a particular policy field, and this
approach of relative salience also was followed in the portfolio allocation.
Verhofstadt managed to reach the scheduled elections of May 2003.
In the Netherlands, a political amourette between Christian Democrats
(CDA) and Liberals (VVD), the most stable coalition type since 1945, ended in
1989. In that year, the government broke down over fiscal policy, and after
early elections, the successful prime minister Lubbers (CDA) formed a new
coalition with the Social Democrats (PVDA). The policy fundamental of this
coalition was an agreement listing points on which the party rank and files had
overcome conflict, or thought they were able to do this during the term in
office. The government reached the end of its term, but in the elections of 1994,
the government parties and particularly the leading CDA suffered unprece-
dented losses. The CDA experienced a leadership crisis, and this further
induced the secular parties PVDA, VVD and D66 to build a coalition without
the Christian Democrats. The three parties negotiated a coalition agreement
dealing with issues on which the Liberals and Social Democrats were furthest
apart, but which did contain less details than could be expected given their new
experience in office together. Nonetheless, the Kok I government reached the
scheduled elections and prolonged its term in office. The Kok II government
taking office in 1998 however had a much longer coalition agreement that also
contained many detailed policy intentions. Apparently, the parties including
the ministers entitled to join the negotiations felt a need to make more
commitments. Just before the end of its term in 2002, the government broke
down after the general feeling had become that it had accomplished most of its
intentions, and suffered from political fatigue.
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Coalition agreements: completeness and preciseness
For each of the six governments, we coded the coalition agreement and made
up a profile including size, completeness, and preciseness.6 Size is text length
in words, as assessed earlier by Mu¨ller and Strøm (2000). Our measure for
completeness is the range of policy fields included in the agreement, relative to
the scope of government action. Though this is not a perfect indicator, scope
may be related to the set of cabinet portfolios that represent fields of
government policy. Thus we speak of a broad scope if the coalition agreement
contains intentions in all or most fields of government policy to which
portfolios are associated. The score on this variable thus is contingent on
cabinet properties: the scope of action and the set of ministerial portfolios.7
Examples of complete coalition agreements are the cases of Martens VIII
(1988) in Belgium and Kok II (1998) in the Netherlands. Not surprisingly,
these agreements also were the longest ever made. We give such complete
agreements the value of 1. Agreements covering some part of the range of
policy fields are given the value 0.75, 0.50, or 0.25. These numerical values are
relative scores.8
Next, we coded preciseness borrowing from a distinction between three types
of policy pledges made by Royed (1996): (1) rhetorical pledges, that is, pledges
the fulfillment of which is practically impossible to assess, for example ‘reduce
poverty’, or ‘increase social harmony’; (2) difficult pledges, which are more
doable but still difficult to carry out (and thus to assess), for example ‘reduce
tax’, or ‘increase efficiency in higher education’; and (3) definite pledges, the
most clear cut category that can be assessed relatively easily, for example ‘cut
income tax by 3% for all employees in the private sector’, or ‘lift the number of
academic diplomas by 20% within 4 years’. Definite pledges resemble what
Luebbert (1986) called explicit compromises; the other types are, in the
terminology of Luebbert, implicit compromises.9 We counted the proportion
of each type of pledge in the coalition agreement, and scored as follows: a
preciseness value of 1 is given if the majority of (not necessarily all) pledges are
definite, and 0 if the agreement has only rhetorical content. Values of 0.25, 0.50
or 0.75 are given if pledges are mostly difficult, or if some combination exists of
rhetorical and definite pledges. Table 1 presents the coalition agreements coded
in this way.
Table 1 shows variation between cabinets. Most variation exists in the
completeness of coalition agreements. This is interesting, because the general
trend since the 1960s as we mentioned before was one of increasing
comprehensiveness of coalition agreements. Our findings show that since the
early 1990s, the picture is more varied. There is no indication of a relationship
between the number of coalition parties and the properties of coalition
agreements. This is in line with a broader pattern across countries observed by
Strøm and Mu¨ller (2001), and Strøm et al. (forthcoming).
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The proportion of precise policy pledges was at least 50% in all cases. The
coalition agreement of the Kok II cabinet even was a very precise blueprint
for policy decisions. The variation between cases reflects the range in policy
statements as the largest part of coalition agreements, a finding reported earlier
by Mu¨ller and Strøm (2000, 576). A remarkable finding is that cabinets with
an unusual or even unprecedented party combination, Dehaene I and Kok I,
had a relatively brief coalition agreement containing a comparatively small
proportion of precise intentions. In fact, when these cabinets began a second
term (which was their preference expressed before the elections), the agreement
was much longer, more complete and more precise.10 This contradicts the
expectation that coalitions voluntarily beginning a second term have built up
trust and ironed out points of controversy during their first term in office, and
thus would take confidence in a less complete and precise agreement. This
appears not to be true, and below we will see whether this indicates an
‘optimistic’ or a ‘pessimistic’ scenario: the agreements were so long and detailed
because parties wanted to show all points of mutual understanding, or major
points of controversy were inherited from the previous term in office.
Coalition life: interparty conflict resolution
As we noted, coalition agreements may or may not iron out points of
controversy. In this section we consider the main conflicts during the tenure of
the six cabinets, and see whether the contested issues had been settled by some
Table 1 Properties of coalition agreements of six governments
Cabinet Parties Size Completeness Preciseness
Dehaene I (1992–1995) PS, PSC, SP, CVP 7,500 0.25 0.50
Dehaene II (1995–1999) PS, PSC, SP, CVP 17,350 1.00 0.75
Verhofstadt I (1999–2003) PS, PRL-FDF-MCC,
Ecolo, SP, VLD, Agalev
14,800 0.75 0.75
Lubbers III (1989–1994) PVDA, CDA 28,450 0.75 0.75
Kok I (1994–1998) PVDA, D66, VVD 16,250 0.75 0.50
Kok II (1998–2002) PVDA, D66, VVD 36,000 1.00 1.00
Abbreviations: PS, Parti Socialiste (French Speaking Labour Party); PSC, Party Social Chre´tien
(French Speaking Christian Democratic Party); SP, Socialistiche Partij (Flemish Labour Party);
CVP, Christelijke Volkspartij (Flemish Christian Democratic Party); PRL-FDF-MCC, Parti
Re´publicain Libe´ral - Front De´mocratique des Francophones - Mouvement des citoyens pour le
changement (French Speaking alliance of Liberal parties); Ecolo (French Speaking Green Party);
VLD, Vlaamse Liberalen en Democraten (Flemish Liberal Party); Agalev (Flemish Green Party).
PVDA, Partij van de Arbeid (Labour Party); CDA, Christen Democratisch Appel (Christian
Democratic Party); VVD, Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie (Liberal/Conservative Party);
D66, Democrats 1966 (Liberal Democrats).
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type of deal in the coalition agreement, or were new and unanticipated policy
problems.11 These points are presented in the Tables 2–5. We present findings
on coalition governance in particular by mentioning the more or less
substantive result of conflict resolution (a compromise, a unilaterally imposed
decision, or a nondecision such as a postponement), as well as the arenas of
conflict resolution. When the issues already were mentioned in the coalition
agreement, we indicate whether the final settlement was in line with the original
deal, or deviated from it.
Fields of policy dispute
Table 2 shows that socio-economic and budgetary policy choices have been the
most controversial. This was most pronounced in the two Kok governments
that excluded the central Christian Democrats and on these issues had to
bridge a considerable policy distance. But also in the other coalitions socio-
economic and budgetary policy together were a frequent source of interparty
dispute. In Belgium, language issues long were the main ‘coalition killer’
(Deschouwer, 1994), but this cleavage line has become much less significant in
the coalition politics of this country, which also speaks from our findings. Thus
the recent institutional arrangements of federalization, with their transfer of
competencies on a number of economic and cultural matters to the regions,
seems to pay off in national coalition politics. Institutional change and
regulatory issues within the domain of justice also gave rise to conflict — the
severe crisis over the national justice system was a main problem in the 1990s in
Belgium, and in the Netherlands the call for democratic reforms by D66, the
smallest coalition party in Kok I and II, triggered major conflict in the late
1990s. Typical ‘morality’ issues such as abortion, euthanasia and sex
discrimination have not become manifest as points of dispute in the arenas
of coalition politics, except for a conflict on rules for divorce. Contrary to these
matters on which suspension and creative procrastination are possible — for
which the coalition agreement often contained procedures — policy decisions
on socio-economic and budgetary issues are hard to avoid. The budgetary cycle
is an institutional reason for recurrence of such issues on the political agenda.
Since issues such as social security privatization and job subsidization involved
party principles, decision-making often went far beyond departmental
routines.
Coalition agreements and conflict prevention
The second observation we make is about the extent to which emerging
conflicts were on issues included in the coalition agreement. Table 3 shows that
two-thirds of all conflicts (29 out of 44) were on matters on which the
agreement contained some kind of intentions. An obvious comment to this
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Table 2 Interparty conflicts in policy fields
Budget Socioeconomic Institutional Language Justice Health Environment Defence Transport Total
Dehaene I 1 2 1 — — — — 1 — 5
Dehaene II — 3 1 1 2 — — — — 7
Verhofstadt I — 2 — 1 1 — 2 — — 6
Lubbers IIII 2 1 — — 1 1 — 1 — 6
Kok I 1 5 2 — — — 1 — 2 11
Kok II 3 2 2 — 1 1 — — — 9
Total 7 15 6 2 5 2 3 2 2 44
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Table 3 Conflicts on issues mentioned and not mentioned in coalition agreement
Conflicts Not in coalition
agreement
In coalition
agreement
Precise in coalition
agreementa
Dehaene I 5 1 4 1
Dehaene II 7 6 1 —
Verhofstadt I 6 5 1 1
Lubbers III 6 3 3 2
Kok I 11 0 11 6
Kok II 9 0 9 7
Total 44 (100%) 15 (34 %) 29 (66 %) 17 (39%)
aThis is a subset of the previous column (In coalition agreement), and includes specific procedural
deals.
Table 4 Locus of conflict initiation and resolution
Conflict initiation Conflict resolution
Cabinet PPG EPO Mix Cabinet PPG EPO Mix
Dehaene I 1 — 2 2 3 — 2 1
Dehaene II 1 2 1 3 5 1 — 1
Verhofstadt I 2 1 2 1 5 1 — —
Subtotal 4 3 5 6 13 2 2 2
Lubbers III 1 — 1 4 3 — — 2
Kok I 2 9 — 5 1 — 5
Kok II 1 8 — 6 — — 3
Subtotal 4 17 1 4 14 1 — 10
Total 8 20 6 10 27 3 2 12
Abbreviations: PPG, Parliamentary Party Group; EPO, Extraparliamentary Party Organization.
Table 5 Type of conflict resolution
Compromise Imposition Nondecision Faithful to coalition agreementa
Dehaene I 3 2 — 4/4
Dehaene II 3 2 2 1/1
Verhofstadt I 2 2 2 1/1
Lubbers III 4 2 — 3/3
Kok I 5 5 1 10/11
Kok II 7 2 — 7/9
Total 24 15 5 26/29
55% 34% 11% 90%
aThis ratio is calculated for cases in which the issue was mentioned in the coalition agreement.
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finding is that coalition agreements often are complete documents, and thus are
likely to contain most of the material on which conflicts can arise. However,
completeness of the agreement does not seem to automatically reduce the level
of conflict during coalition life. The Dehaene II government had a very
complete agreement but experienced mostly unanticipated conflicts, whereas
the preceding Dehaene I government did with a rather incomplete agreement
which nonetheless set almost the whole agenda of interparty conflict.12 This
contradictory pattern is more typical for Belgium than for the Netherlands, as
in this second country almost all conflicts were on policy intentions mentioned
in the coalition agreement. In the case of Dehaene II, the significance of
conflict outside the coalition agreement stemmed in large part from the blame
the parties received for the national crisis in the police and judicial system in
the Dutroux affair.
However, deals in the coalition agreement, and even precise deals, do not
appear to prevent recurring conflict as much as politicians may expect when
negotiating. There is large variation between Belgium and the Netherlands on
this point, and to a lesser extent also between the different cabinets.
Particularly in the two Kok cabinets in the Netherlands, the coalition
agreements barely helped preventing conflict on previously debated matters.
Above we noted the salience of budgetary and socio-economic issues in these
coalitions excluding the central Christian Democrats, and it is clear that these
issues need further negotiation beyond the coalition agreement. Conflicts on
pledges that were precise often arose because economic developments required
or allowed policy changes not foreseen during government formation. For the
Kok I government, the economic tide was much better than expected, and
the major points of interparty dispute were about resetting policy priorities.
The Dutch experience bears heavily on the average result for all six cabinets,
which is that precise deals did not function as a conflict prevention mechanism
more often than imprecise deals, nor even compared to issues left unmentioned
in the coalition agreement. In Belgium, conflicts were more often on issues not
included or mentioned only generally or vaguely in the coalition agreement.
Next to the turbulence during Dehaene II over the judiciary system, the diverse
conflicts during the Verhofstadt I cabinet suggest that the allocation of policy
issues to different coalition party ministers including the Greens did not work
as smoothly as may have been expected. Our further analysis will show
however that the coalition agreements were still quite relevant for resolving
conflicts — while not preventing them.
Arenas of conflict initiation and resolution
Where were these new and recurring conflicts initiated? Table 4 shows
variation across the two countries as well as between governments. By and
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large, the extraparliamentary party organization, as a single conflict initiator or
as one among other party branches, was relatively important in Belgium. In the
Netherlands, the parliamentary party groups were prominent in raising matters
to the point of dispute. In both countries, the cabinet thus was not the most
important arena where interparty conflicts broke out. This seems to be more
than a coincidence: the party branches most involved in conflict initiation in
Belgium and the Netherlands also were most directly involved in coalition
formation in which, as we saw, deals were made that often needed
interpretation, further elaboration, or renegotiation. To an extent, therefore,
this fits the label of Belgium as a ‘particracy’ (De Winter, 1996) and the
Netherlands as a ‘fractiocracy’ (Andeweg, 2000b).
The arenas of conflict resolution differed widely from the arenas where
conflicts broke out. In both countries, the cabinet or some informal committee
within the cabinet was the arena used most for settling interparty disputes —
this finding even holds for all six individual governments. Our data also show
that the cabinet is important for conflict resolution when matters were not
included in the coalition agreement.13 This finding only partly reflects the
exceptional circumstances arising during the Deheane II government, when the
cabinet faced a national crisis in the judicial system. Our inference is that
matters not pre-considered in the coalition agreement do leave more discretion
to cabinets, even when interparty conflicts break out. In the Netherlands,
arenas of mixed composition also were important, particularly in the Kok I
government in office between 1994 and 1998. These mixed arenas were
particularly functional for issues on which the agreement was imprecise —
deals needed interpretation by the different party branches involved in making
these deals in the first place.
The finding that the parties in government are prominent in conflict
resolution fits a more general pattern of uses of conflict resolution arenas in
Belgium and the Netherlands (Andeweg and Timmermans, forthcoming). Even
in the Netherlands where mixed arenas of conflict resolution exist, however,
internal cabinet arenas appear to be more important than may be expected for
conflicts between parties rather than between ministers as heads of depart-
ments. This can be explained only in part by the institutional imperatives of
budgetary politics. Cabinet ministers have much to loose when a government
breakdown occurs, and the increased electoral uncertainly may be an extra
incentive for conflict settlement. This is consistent with the finding that
interparty conflicts do not often break out within the cabinet but rather outside
it, where the pressures for party political profilation are felt more strongly.
Moreover, inspection of the findings shows that for the two governments
beginning a second term, the cabinet became an even more important arena of
conflict resolution. This may indicate a self-constructed capacity for internal
conflict resolution, the result of ministerial team building.14
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Types of conflict resolution and faithfulness
The findings on results of conflict resolution are given in Tables 5 and 6. We
distinguish between compromise, imposition and nondecision. Imposition
means that a more or less substantive solution is forced by one coalition
member on another, and is accepted as such. Table 5 shows that coalition
governments in Belgium and the Netherlands live up to their reputation as
‘compromise machines’ in the politics of accommodation. More than half of
all conflicts (24 out of 44) were settled in this way. Compared to an earlier
analysis of government conflicts in the Netherlands between 1973 and 1986,
compromises seem to have become more frequent (Timmermans and Bakema,
1990). Table 6 shows that compromises emerge on issues already mentioned in
detail in the coalition agreement, but this type of result ensued also when
intentions were left vague or were not mentioned at all. A remarkable finding is
that imposition occurs not only when precise deals on issues in the coalition
agreement existed — a matter of credible commitment — but also when the
real bargaining still had to begin when the government took office. This is
remarkable, because in situations of interparty confrontation, imposition of a
decision on another party is risky.
Risk avoidance may explain why most of the nondecisions occurred when
issues were left unmentioned in the coalition agreement. However, this was not
the dominant strategy on all issues, on which time pressure sometimes was a
legitimizing factor for imposition of decisions. Parties thus also exploited the
moral and political commitments of coalition loyalty and collective respon-
sibility. This is so, despite the existence of a behavioural rule that limits the
freedom of manoeuvre of parties on matters not mentioned in the coalition
agreement.15
Our findings show further that on issues included in the coalition agreement,
nearly always a substantive result was achieved. Nondecisions resulted in all
cases except one from situations where the coalition agreement was silent on
the issue. Conversely, of all controversial issues on which the coalition
agreement had something to say, as much as 90% (26 out of 29) of the
decisions were in line with the coalition agreement. When compromises
emerged, the substance was close to the letter (precise statements) or the spirit
Table 6 Type of conflict resolution related to coalition agreement
Imposition Compromise Nondecision
Precise in CA 7 10 — 17
Imprecise in CA 4 7 1 12
Not in CA 4 7 4 15
Total 15 24 5 44
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(imprecise statements) of the coalition agreement. The agreement thus
functioned as a policy agenda, and reciprocal control among parties was a
mechanism for enforcement, despite the frequent recurrence of policy conflict.
This pattern is consistent with findings on political implementation of coalition
agreements in earlier years (Timmermans, 2003). Though on some occasions,
conflicts escalated into a crisis (Dehaene I in 1995, and Kok II in 1999, which
was resolved), the vast majority of political deals written down in agreements
were enforced within the arenas of conflict resolution. Thus, this analysis
shows that coalition agreements in Belgium and the Netherlands play a part
beyond the political rhetoric, and do delineate government policy even if
conflict occurs. Arenas of coalition governance are important informal
institutional machinery for enforcement and conflict resolution, also for issues
not included in coalition agreements. Both must be seen in combination —
agreements and conflict resolution arenas are mechanisms for containing
policy conflict and enhance the longevity of governments at times of increased
electoral turbulence.
Conclusion and Outlook
The increased electoral turbulence in Belgium and the Netherlands in the past
15 years went with a stabilization of coalition governments. To account for this
paradoxical trend, we analysed mechanisms of coalition governance in both
countries. The governance mechanisms on which we focused are coalition
policy agreements and arenas for settling interparty dispute. We also analysed
types of conflict resolution.
The three Belgian and three Dutch governments considered in this
study varied in their policy basis at the advent of installation. We found that
the two governments beginning a second term (Dehaene II in 1995, and Kok II
in 1998) had a much more complete and precise coalition agreement than
when they first took office. A prolongation in office of a government
thus not only is a demonstration of mutual trust among coalition parties.
Behind the ‘manifesto moonshine’, experiences of conflict, unfinished policy
trajectories, and, indeed, the alleged shortcomings of an incomplete coalition
agreement are incentives for parties to talk seriously about policy before taking
off again. More generally, matters of budgetary, socio-economic or other kinds
of policy involving party principles are notoriously difficult to subject to
routine decision-making. Collectively shared decisions require continuous
persuasion and bargaining, and all this leads to loops in the policy-making
process.
An important finding in our analysis is that most emerging conflicts were on
issues already delineated in some way in the coalition agreement. The most
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frequent sources of conflict were budgetary and socio-economic policy (half of
all analysed conflicts, see Table 2), to which the institutional cycle of budgetary
politics applies stronger than to other matters. One-third of all conflicts were
‘unforeseen’ — there were no written intentions or procedures in the
agreement. This suggests that agreements are an important policy agenda,
but also are, perhaps to the regret of party leaders, less effective as a
mechanism for conflict prevention. Though conflicts mostly were on matters
not mentioned or were mentioned only vaguely in the agreement, also precise
substantive or procedural deals gave rise to new conflict. This recurrence of
conflict however will not so often be a real surprise to party leaders — they are
not naive and know what they play for. Nevertheless, in the vast majority of
cases, deals in the coalition agreement were enforced. Since agreements are not
self-enforcing, additional governance mechanisms were vital for both the
degree of faith and the stability of the government.
The arenas of conflict management and the ensuing types of conflict
settlement in these arenas show some variation between the two countries
according to their respective images as a system dominated by the
extraparliamentary parties (Belgium) and a system with more mixed coalition
power structures (the Netherlands). Generally, when the chips are down, the
majority groups in the two Dutch chambers of parliament are loyal
government supporters, but they do initiate conflict much more often than
in Belgium (see Table 4). In Belgium, dissent in parliamentary votes is rare
(Depauw, 2002).16 The party presidents however face countervailing powers
from within their parties when other prominents enter the cabinet (Eraly,
2002).
The findings that stand out most are the increased prominence, in both
countries, of internal cabinet arenas for conflict resolution, and the frequency
of compromises emerging from this internal coalition machinery. Despite
conflict, more often than not these compromises were hammered out in good
faith to the coalition agreement whenever the matter was mentioned, or were
made en route if reference to earlier deals was impossible. But even in this last
type of situation, the spirit of coalition discipline filled the backrooms of
coalition governance. The internal sphere of the cabinet, in some informal
setting that institutionalized or was created ad hoc, thus has become crucial for
coalition governance in the two countries. While in the Netherlands this is a
continuation of an existing practice, our findings for Belgium are more ad
odds with the experience of party presidents as dominant players in coalition
politics. The national crisis situation during the Dehaene II government may
explain part of this role shift to the cabinet, but not all. Another explanation
may be the alleged fresh approach of governing of the Verhofstadt I ‘rainbow’
coalition in 1999, which started with a coalition agreement apportioning issues
to parties, and which gave individual ministers more leeway. Though the
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numbers of conflict we found are limited, this coalition experienced most
conflicts initiated within the cabinet, and also most instances of cabinet conflict
resolution. Indeed, if the extraparliamentary parties were involved in conflict
initiation, they were not the prime players in conflict resolution — a pattern
that departs from past practice. The entrance of party notables into the
cabinet observed by Eraly (2002) thus has become visible in the patterns of
coalition governance in Belgium, and it also seems to pay off in stabilizing the
government. In the Netherlands, the continuity in coalition governance
during the Kok I and II government contrasts with the proclaimed new
governing style. In 2002, the inclusion of the Lijst Pim Fortuyn in the
Balkenende I cabinet led to a very early collapse, but after the formation of
the Balkenende II cabinet much of the apparatus of coalition governance was
re-installed.
Thus, our main conclusion about the puzzle of a destabilizing electorate and
stabilizing government in the two low countries is that coalition agreements
and conflict resolution arenas have become key mechanisms of coalition
governance, and that the specific locus of coalition governance has shifted
more to the interior of the cabinet. Ministers are more carefully avoiding
coalition termination than before. The institutionalization of these mechanisms
of coalition governance involves the norm of coalition discipline. This norm is
also the base line for parliamentary parties on matters of coalition policy. With
rising electoral stakes, MPs may stirr parliamentary debates to enhance their
visibility. However, while this seems to happen more clearly in the Netherlands
than in Belgium, even in the Dutch situation this involves a good deal of
rhetoric and posture, and parliamentary coalition parties are well aware of the
collective limit of tolerance when major issues are at stake.
In both countries, there is recent talk of ‘old’ and ‘new’ politics. Taking stock
against the practice of hidden control by party elites, a marginalized role of
parliament, and an alleged legitimacy crisis and citizen apathy, political
entrepreneurs proclaimed a need for a ‘new’ politics, in which visibility and
transparency are key concepts. Our analysis however suggests that, despite
announcements of political changes by cabinets taking office since the mid-
1990, the transfer of policy issues to arenas of ‘invisible politics’ is still a vital
mechanism of coalition governance, locking parties in what is called the ‘old’
politics. If a shift in politics is taking place, it rather seems to be one to arenas
outside the traditional institutions of parliamentary democracy. While
coalition governments have stabilized, such a development to a ‘postparlia-
mentary democracy’ involves its own challenge for the political systems of
Belgium and the Netherlands. This challenge requires that political parties in
government take the continuing electoral turbulence not only as an inducement
for making internal safety mechanisms, but also for taking a more fundamental
outward look.
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Notes
1 In Belgium, even successive governments reached the end of their legal term. In 1999, Dehaene
II, and in 2003, Verhofstadt I ended with scheduled elections.
2 In Belgium, the Upper Chamber holds an investiture vote on new cabinets, which happened in
all cases, so for this country this condition cannot explain the increase in government survival.
In the Netherlands, the Upper Chamber only has veto power, which is used infrequently. In
1999, a coalition crisis occurred after government defeat in a vote in the Upper Chamber. The
vote required a two-thirds majority because it was on a Constitutional change introducing a
national referendum. The crisis however was resolved en route by renegotiation of the issue, and
the cabinet continued its term in office.
3 Analysis of cabinet conflicts in the Netherlands in the period 1973–1986 shows that one-third
was party political (Timmermans and Bakema, 1990, 178).
4 Given our research question, we focus only on conflicts within majority parties, that is not on
conflict between government and opposition, neither between government and societal actors
(interest groups, etc.).
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5 Coalitions at regional and federal level always were symmetrical, so had a similar party
composition, until this unwritten rule was dropped after the regional elections of 2004. We focus
on governance at federal level, noting that possible differences in patterns between regional and
federal level are a relevant research subject ahead.
6 The coalition agreement precedes the government declaration, which is presented formally in
parliament when the government takes office. The coalition agreement is the immediate output
of interparty negotiations and in Belgium and the Netherlands is also published, mostly since the
1970s. Coalition agreements are discussed and adopted by the party organizations at the end of
policy negotiations in government formation.
7 The scope of government action is not constant; it expanded in the 1960s and 1970s and is
changing in more recent years. Thus agreements in the past always were less ‘complete’ if an
absolute measure would be used. In Belgium, absence of deals on language issues from the
coalition agreement would render it incomplete, but not in the Netherlands because the issue is
not salient. A coalition agreement with a narrower policy scope than the range of fields of
government intervention and the set of corresponding cabinet portfolios is incomplete to some
degree.
8 A score of 0 is possible theoretically, but occurs only if parties do not draft a coalition agreement
at all. This has not happened in the last decades (see Moury (2004) for a more extensive analysis
of completeness of coalition agreements).
9 Luebbert focused on controversial issues during government formation (see also Timmermans,
2003), in this article we consider the broader range of significant pledges in coalition agreements.
Royed’s approach has proved of value in earlier assessments of election manifestos, with an
intercoder reliability of over 80% (Royed, 1996, 79–80; Thomson, 2001, 194).
10 This also happened in the run up to Verhofstadt II, following Verhofstadt I in 2003 (see Moury,
2004).
11 The information sources for this analysis of interparty conflict and resolution were Keesings
Historical Archives, yearly expert reports, supplemented by newspaper content analysis by using
search keywords such as conflict, interparty tension, etc. For the Netherlands, we used the
Jaarboek Documentatiecentrum Politieke Partijen (DNPP Groningen), NRC Handelsblad and
De Volkskrant. For Belgium, we used the annual Overzicht van het Belgische politieke gebeuren
(Res Publica) and La Libre Belgique, Le Soir, De Morgen and De Tijd.
12 The apparent disfunctioning of the police and judiciary system when the childmurderer
M. Dutroux was arrested and escaped led the Dehaene II government to drastically shift
attention to judiciary reform.
13 The cabinet even was more prominent for this type of conflicts than when matters were precise
or imprecise in the agreement (11 out of 15, against 10 out of 17 when the agreement was precise,
and 6 out of 12 when the agreement was imprecise).
14 Note that in both cases also the coalition agreement was more complete and precise than when
the same parties were in office for a first term.
15 The coalition agreements of Dehaene I and II even explicitly mentioned this rule, but it was
abandoned by the Verhofstadt I government. In the Netherlands, this indirect commitment is
not formalized, but agreements sometimes do mention issues on which parties are allowed a free
vote in parliament.
16 In the analysis by Depauw (2002), Belgium even is the second most disciplined country, after
Denmark. In Denmark, however, the frequency of minority governments implies a stronger
emphasis on parliamentary party discipline than in Belgium, because in such situations
discipline is much more critical to obtaining a majority in the Danish parliament.
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